Iranian Influence Operations Target U.S. Racial Divisions Online, Analysts Warn

Cybersecurity researchers and disinformation analysts say Iranian-linked influence operations are increasingly exploiting America’s racial and political fault lines online, amplifying divisive content to undermine public support for U.S. policy toward Tehran. The campaigns, which rely heavily on organic engagement from unwitting American users, mark an evolution of tactics long associated with Russian and Chinese state actors.

Disinformation researchers tracking state-linked activity say Iranian influence operations have shifted from clumsy, easily detected bot networks toward more sophisticated narrative campaigns that latch onto genuine American political and cultural disputes. Rather than inventing new grievances, operatives reframe well-known chapters of U.S. history — chattel slavery, segregation, the internment of Japanese Americans, and the treatment of Native peoples — and recontextualize them alongside U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The goal, analysts contend, is to portray American moral authority as inherently compromised, thereby weakening public backing for sanctions, military deterrence, or aid to Israel in its ongoing conflict with Iran-aligned forces.

The tactic is not new in concept. Russia’s Internet Research Agency famously seeded divisive racial content ahead of the 2016 U.S. election, operating fake Black Lives Matter and pro-police accounts simultaneously to inflame tensions on both sides. What distinguishes the current Iranian effort, according to analysts at Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, is its tighter alignment with ongoing kinetic conflict — including the Israel-Hamas war, strikes on Houthi positions, and direct exchanges between Israel and Iran. Networks such as Storm-2035, publicly identified by Microsoft in 2024, have been linked to efforts to impersonate both progressive and conservative U.S. voters, a hallmark of classic wedge-driving influence work.

Researchers emphasize that the most effective propaganda rarely originates from obvious foreign accounts; instead, seeded material is amplified when authentic American users — including activists, influencers, and everyday social media participants — share it because it resonates with genuinely held views. That dynamic complicates enforcement. Platforms can remove coordinated inauthentic behavior, but First Amendment protections and platform policies typically shield domestic users who reshare foreign-origin content. Civil liberties advocates have cautioned against overbroad takedowns, warning that legitimate domestic speech on race, policing, and foreign policy should not be conflated with foreign interference. Intelligence officials, for their part, say public awareness — not censorship — remains the primary defense, urging users to scrutinize accounts with short histories, inconsistent posting patterns, or sudden pivots between unrelated political topics.