Beijing Moves Swiftly to Court Hungary’s Incoming Leader Péter Magyar After Orbán’s Historic Defeat

The Chinese Communist Party moved quickly to congratulate Péter Magyar, Hungary’s expected next prime minister, following his party’s decisive victory over Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz — a result that ended one of Europe’s longest-serving governments. Beijing’s rapid outreach signals a concerted effort to preserve the extensive economic, diplomatic, and strategic foothold it cultivated in Hungary over Orbán’s 16 years in power, raising questions about whether Magyar will maintain or recalibrate Budapest’s uniquely close relationship with China.

Hungary’s role as Beijing’s most reliable ally within the European Union has been one of the defining features of Orbán’s foreign policy, and one that carried significant consequences for the bloc’s ability to present a unified front on China-related issues. Under Orbán, Hungary welcomed billions of euros in Chinese investment, most notably the planned construction of a BYD electric vehicle battery plant in Szeged — one of the largest Chinese manufacturing investments in Europe — and the controversial plan to build a campus of Shanghai’s Fudan University in Budapest, a project that drew massive public protests in 2021. Hungary also became the only EU member to participate enthusiastically in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and Budapest served as a hub for Chinese telecommunications infrastructure at a time when most European nations were restricting or banning companies like Huawei from their 5G networks on security grounds. Critically, Orbán repeatedly used Hungary’s veto power in the European Council to water down or block joint EU statements criticizing China’s treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, its crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy, and its military posturing in the Taiwan Strait.

The speed of Beijing’s outreach to Magyar underscores the strategic importance China places on maintaining its Hungarian beachhead. Péter Magyar, a 44-year-old former Fidesz insider turned anti-corruption crusader, rose to national prominence with remarkable velocity after breaking publicly with Orbán’s government in early 2024. His TISZA (Respect and Freedom) party channeled widespread public frustration over corruption, democratic backsliding, and Hungary’s increasing isolation within the EU. While Magyar has positioned himself as firmly pro-European and pro-NATO — a significant departure from Orbán’s stance — he has been strategically ambiguous about the fate of existing Chinese investments. Canceling multibillion-euro projects already under contract would carry legal and economic costs, and thousands of Hungarian jobs are tied to Chinese-funded ventures. At the same time, Magyar’s pro-EU orientation suggests he may be less willing to serve as China’s reliable blocking vote within European institutions, which could have far-reaching implications for EU foreign policy coherence on issues ranging from trade tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles to collective security postures in the Indo-Pacific.

The coming weeks and months will be closely watched by European capitals, Washington, and Beijing alike. Magyar’s transition team will need to decide how to handle the approximately €16 billion in Chinese investment commitments made under Orbán, including the Fudan campus project — which remains deeply unpopular with Budapest residents — and the BYD factory. European leaders will be keen to see whether Hungary drops its pattern of vetoing China-related EU foreign policy statements, which would significantly strengthen Brussels’ hand in trade negotiations and geopolitical positioning. For Beijing, the loss of Orbán represents a potentially serious setback to its European strategy, which has relied heavily on cultivating individual member-state relationships to prevent unified EU action. Whether Magyar can balance domestic economic interests, his EU-aligned foreign policy vision, and Beijing’s aggressive courtship will be one of the most consequential diplomatic storylines in Europe in the months ahead.